Putem citi ºi discuta biblia ca literaturã – indiferent dacã o acceptãm (sau nu) ca sursã pentru gândi teologic ºi a trãi creºtineºte?

un dialog foarte interesant al unui preot ortodox cu un ateu...

www.crestinortodox.ro/cuvinte-duhovnicesti/dialog-apologetic-par...

doamne ajutã!

De la: ioanna_dark, la data 2010-02-10 20:10:37un dialog foarte interesant al unui preot ortodox cu un ateu...

www.crestinortodox.ro/cuvinte-duhovnicesti/dialog-apologetic-par...

doamne ajutã!

Ioana, aceastã abordare este mai degrabã anectodicã ºi nu rãstoarnã πᾶν ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον κατὰ toatã trufia care se ridicã împotriva τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ cunoaºterii lui Dumnezeu, ci stârneºte doar zâmbetul înþelegãtor ºi amabil cuvenit unei feþe bisericeºti. Un interlocutor ateu cu o pregãtire filosoficã minimã, nu neaparat formalã într-o instituþie de învãþãmânt superior, nu s-ar recunoaºte probabil deloc în persoana ºi obiecþiile aºa-zisului "ideolog comunist" din dialogul (real sau imaginar) din textul la care faci tu referire. Aº recomanda încã odatã (ºtiu cã am mai fãcut-o acum câteva luni bune) tuturor celor care scriu pe acest forum despre (in)existenþa lui Dumnezeu (de multe ori la un nivel sub-mediocru) sã urmãreascã conversaþiile dintre un filosof teist (creºtin) de la Notre Dame, Alvin Plantinga, ºi un filosof non-teist de la Universitatea din Colorado, Michael O'Tooley; cartea în care aceste conversaþii apar se numeºte Knowledge of God (Blackwell Publishing, 2008) ºi este coeditatã de cei doi.

De la: adipopa, la data 2010-02-10 23:01:45

De la: ioanna_dark, la data 2010-02-10 20:10:37un dialog foarte interesant al unui preot ortodox cu un ateu...

www.crestinortodox.ro/cuvinte-duhovnicesti/dialog-apologetic-par...

doamne ajutã!

Ioana, aceastã abordare este mai degrabã anectodicã ºi nu rãstoarnã πᾶν ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον κατὰ toatã trufia care se ridicã împotriva τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ cunoaºterii lui Dumnezeu, ci stârneºte doar zâmbetul înþelegãtor ºi amabil cuvenit unei feþe bisericeºti. Un interlocutor ateu cu o pregãtire filosoficã minimã, nu neaparat formalã într-o instituþie de învãþãmânt superior, nu s-ar recunoaºte probabil deloc în persoana ºi obiecþiile aºa-zisului "ideolog comunist" din dialogul (real sau imaginar) din textul la care faci tu referire. Aº recomanda încã odatã (ºtiu cã am mai fãcut-o acum câteva luni bune) tuturor celor care scriu pe acest forum despre (in)existenþa lui Dumnezeu (de multe ori la un nivel sub-mediocru) sã urmãreascã conversaþiile dintre un filosof teist (creºtin) de la Notre Dame, Alvin Plantinga, ºi un filosof non-teist de la Universitatea din Colorado, Michael O'Tooley; cartea în care aceste conversaþii apar se numeºte Knowledge of God (Blackwell Publishing, 2008) ºi este coeditatã de cei doi.

adi...si totusi...principalele probleme pe care le ridica ateii de obicei sunt
1) exista foarte multe religii pe glob
2) nu putem demonstra cu argumente ca minunile descrise in biblie chiar s-au petrecut in realitate
3) iisus a fost un mare invatat , dar nu a fost dumnezeu...
4) ce s-a intamplat cu iisus era doar a inventie de-a evreilor....
etc...
pe toate le-am auzit pe forumul asta....

si nu ai mai facut recomandarea asta ...as fi știut și m-aș fi uitat peste carte (mai ales ca pe tooley il cunosc din liceu...dar nu stiam ca a fost si ateu , desi banuiam)...
eu chiar m-am uitat peste toate cartile pe care le-ai recomandat...(chiar aseara am reusit sa citesc un capitol din history and truth a lui paul ricoer)

Ioana, este adevãrat cã dialogul dintre Epifanie Teodoropulos ºi acel presupus ideolog comunits atinge ºi puncte de interes apologetic general, însã o face la un nivel anecdotic ºi miopic, fãrã a lãrgi cadrul sau a ancora subiectul epistemic ºi ontologic, probabil în speranþa cã o zicere de înþelepciune, o maximã, o vorbã bine întoarsã ºi rostitã blajin, etc., vor întoarce un "fiu rãtãcit" la Hristos. Ei, cum spuneam, abordarea sa homileticã ºi pastoralã va fi probabil convingãtoare ºi suficientã pentru un anumit interlocutor, însã (fãrã a vorbi cu aroganþã) mã îndoiesc cã discursul sãu ar putea avea vreun merit într-o aulã academicã.

În altã ordine de idei, da, sunt convins cã am mai prezentat (cu anticipaþie) dialogul dintre Plantinga ºi Tooley, chiar aici, dar am vorbit totodatã despre Tooley ºi în contextul discuþiilor despre avort. Întrucât am gãsit o recenzie foarte bunã a cãrþii, recenzie semnatã de William L. Rowe, de la Universitatea Purdue, îngãduie-mi sã o postez integral mai jos:

=====================================
Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God
Blackwell Publishing, 2008, 270pp., $34.95 (pbk)
ISBN 9780631193647.
=====================================

The first two chapters -- Plantinga's "Against Naturalism" and Tooley's "Does God Exist?" -- make clear the central issues in the debate between these two distinguished philosophers. Plantinga provides an account of how faith, "belief in the central features of the Christian message", can be knowledge. For if the belief-producing process includes the activity of the Holy Spirit, and works the way it was designed, "according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth", then "if it is held with sufficient firmness (and assuming that it is true), it will constitute knowledge" (p. 12). He rejects naturalism since it cannot accommodate the idea of proper function "for such organisms as plants and animals and human beings" and, if true, "leads directly to Humean skepticism, the condition in which you have a defeater for whatever you believe and cannot sensibly trust your cognitive faculties" (p. 19). He suggests that the reason naturalism can't accommodate the notion of proper function "is that this notion, the notion of proper function, essentially involves the aims and intentions of one or more conscious and intelligent designers" (p. 29). He also argues that naturalism leads to skepticism, is self-defeating ("if it is true, it is irrational to believe it"), and cannot accommodate belief ("if naturalism is true, no one believes anything") (p. 19).

While naturalism cannot employ Plantinga's concept of 'proper function', I suspect that it (1) can produce a view of the conditions in nature that living things require in order to survive, and (2) can form a rational view of what acts and conditions living things must endeavor to avoid if they are to survive, as well as what acts they should seek to do in order to have the best chance to continue to survive -- and this may be true even if no such being as the theistic God happens to exist. At the very least, it seems to be reasonable for a non-theist to hold such a belief. What the non-believer cannot do is employ Plantinga's concept of 'proper function', given Plantinga's view that proper function "essentially involves the aims and intentions of one or more conscious and intelligent designers" (p. 29). So, I believe that theism can provide a stronger explanation for the existence of intelligent human creatures than is provided by the Darwinian theory of evolution. One important question that remains is whether naturalism entails materialism. Plantinga thinks "that the vast majority of naturalists are materialists about human beings" and adds that he has been conducting his argument (that naturalism implies skepticism) under the assumption that to be a naturalist is to be a materialist (p. 49). I should add that while many, if not most, naturalists may be materialists, I'm not taking naturalism to entail materialism. Indeed, Plantinga does allow that a naturalist may be a dualist, and thus be able to accommodate beliefs. But he thinks that we have no reason to think that such beliefs will be true (p. 50). Perhaps, however, trial and error, as well as the apparent survival benefit of having true beliefs, provides us with such a reason, albeit, a weaker reason than theism may provide. In any case, it seems clear that Plantinga's main objection is not to naturalism as such, but to materialism. His justification for including naturalism is his view that the vast majority of naturalists are "materialists about human beings" (p. 49).

In Chapter 2, "Does God Exist?", after reviewing a variety of arguments against theism, Tooley considers whether the existence of God is epistemically justified -- arguing on the basis of the terrible evils in our world that the existence of God is very unlikely. He begins by considering one particular instance of evil: "the earthquake that destroyed Lisbon in 1755, which was felt as far away as southern France and North Africa, and which killed approximately 60,000 men, women, and children" (p. 116), from which he concludes that it is more likely than not that God does not exist (at least at the time of the earthquake). The argument rests on two basic claims: "It is logically necessary that, for any possible state of affairs S, if the action of choosing not to prevent S is morally wrong, all things considered, then an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect person would never perform that action" (p. 117); and "The Lisbon earthquake occurred, and the action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake is morally wrong, all things considered" (p. 118). The next important claim is described as "a crucial probabilistic claim": "The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and a very serious one" (p. 119). We then have a premise telling us that the probability that an action is wrong, "given that an action has a wrongmaking property we know of, and no rightmaking properties -- including ones of which we have no knowledge -- is greater than one half" (p. 120). This leads to the preliminary conclusion that: The logical probability that God did not exist at the time of the Lisbon earthquake, given that choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a wrongmaking property that we know of, and that there are no rightmaking properties known to be counterbalancing, is greater that one half. (p. 121)

Tooley sees a difficulty in reasoning from all known Ps are Qs to its being likely that all Ps are Qs -- where P is a good state of affairs and Q is 'P does not justify permitting a great evil such as tragic death of 60,000 men, women, and children' in the Lisbon earthquake -- as opposed to reasoning from all known Ps are Qs to its being likely that the next P is Q. While I fully agree with him that the first claim is "significantly stronger" than the second, I suspect that no rational human being who doesn't believe that God exists really thinks that there is some good state of affairs that morally justifies the permission of the suffering and death of 50,000 human beings in the Lisbon earthquake. This is not to say that it isn't better to use a weaker claim than a stronger claim, if the weaker claim can accomplish what the stronger claim was employed to do. Tooley's conclusion is that "unless there is countervailing evidence in support of the existence of God, or unless belief in the existence of God can be shown to be non-inferentially justified, and in a way that is not easily defeasible, the argument from evil establishes not only that one cannot know that God exists, but also, and even more unhappily, that it is unlikely -- indeed, extremely unlikely -- that God exists" (p. 146).

In Chapter 3, "Reply to Tooley's Opening Statement", Plantinga notes that the so-called "logical argument from evil" -- that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being who created the world -- has now been abandoned in favor of evidential arguments, arguments that, at best, show only that the existence of God is improbable or unlikely. He also notes that in addition to arguments for the existence of God there are religious experiences that are taken to be a basis for belief in God. Turning to Tooley's argument from evil, Plantinga questions Tooley's view that in the absence of any evidence for or against the existence of God, "the right or rational position is atheism" (p. 164). For in his opening statement Plantinga argued that via the "sensus divinitatis" there is non-propositional evidence for the existence of God (p. 164). However, setting aside such evidence and setting aside any evidence against the existence of God, Plantinga considers what he calls "the intrinsic probability of God's existence". Noting Tooley's view that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly evil being, or the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, morally indifferent being, is each as probable as the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being, Plantinga questions Tooley's claim that atheism, not theism or agnosticism, is the rational position, given that there is no evidence, propositional or otherwise, for belief in God. "Why wouldn't agnosticism be perfectly rational?" (p. 165). I'm inclined here to accept Plantinga's point that in the situation under discussion -- no evidence either for or against the existence of God -- agnosticism may well be the rational position. My only reservation is my expectation that, should God (an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being who created the world) exist, he would want his creatures to have evidence sufficient for their coming to the rational belief that he exists -- realizing, of course, that many theists believe that this is precisely what God did before humans sinned. On the other hand, for human beings who while young came to believe in God and sought to serve him, and now seek some personal sense of God's presence, and do so sincerely in order to sustain their belief in him, and yet have no sense at all of his presence, it is difficult, if not perhaps unreasonable, I would say, for them to continue in their belief. Plantinga's sensus divinitatis is a wonderful idea. Unfortunately, it does not appear to be widespread. Nor does it appear to be true, at least for some, that anyone "who sincerely seeks, shall find".

In his reply to Tooley's opening statement, Plantinga considers his twenty-one step probabilistic argument from evil for the conclusion: The logical probability that God did not exist at the time of the Lisbon earthquake, given that choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a wrongmaking property that we know of, and that there are no rightmaking properties known to be counterbalancing, is greater than one half. (p. 121)

His first point is that even supposing that it can be shown that the existence of God is improbable with respect to the existence of evil, or a particular kind of evil, "God's existence might still be more likely than not on our total evidence" (p. 152). He also notes support among many classical theologians (Aquinas and others) for the view he himself holds: "God is a necessary being, he exists in every possible world; he could not have failed to exist" (p. 154). So, God can't be contingent, and therefore, exists in every possible world.

I think Plantinga is entirely correct in holding that God cannot be a contingent being, a being who exists in some possible worlds but does not exist in other possible worlds. For example, should he then happen to exist in the possible world that is actual, it allows us to imagine God bowing down and thanking his lucky stars that one of the worlds in which he exists just happens to be the actual world. Such a possibility represents, in my judgment, a demeaning view of God. There is good reason, therefore, to reject the view that God is a contingent being in the sense that he may exist in some possible worlds but fail to exist in others. On the other hand, an atheist, friendly or unfriendly, cannot rationally agree that God is a necessary being in the sense that he actually exists in every possible world. As a (hopefully possible) way out of this difficulty, I suggest the following conception of God: "God is such that if he exists in any possible world, he exists in every possible world". I suspect that theists, agnostics, and atheists can accept this proposition. All they then need disagree on is whether God exists in the actual world (the world in which we live and of which we have some direct knowledge). And they may agree on another important point: If he does exist in the actual world, he exists in every possible world; whereas, if he doesn't exist in the actual world, he exists in no possible world. If the former is true, God may be said to enjoy a sort of necessary existence; whereas, if the latter is true, God fails to exist in any possible world.

In Chapter 4, "Reply to Plantinga's Opening Statement", Tooley responds to Plantinga's "most important argument" to show that naturalism is untenable because "the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given naturalism, is inscrutable" (p. 206). In his response Tooley contends that our perceptual faculties are not reliable in Plantinga's sense because "all the beliefs they naturally generate concerning secondary qualities are false, since they locate those properties in external physical objects, whereas those properties are in fact properties of experiences" (p. 216). We are simply mistaken, he suggests, when we think that the grass we see has the property of being green -- for the greenness is a property of the experience rather than of the grass that is seen. Only by supplementing our experiences with "scientific reasoning and theorizing" have we been able to "arrive at beliefs about the objects we perceive that are true, rather than false" (p. 216). Tooley concludes the chapter by pointing out (correctly, I believe) "that even if some argument against naturalism were sound, that would not serve to show that it was reasonable to believe in the existence of God" (p. 217).

In Chapter 5, "Can Robots Think? Reply to Tooley's Second Statement", Plantinga responds to Tooley's objections to his arguments against naturalism, focusing mainly on Tooley's attempt to explain how it is possible for a material object to think, and his reply to the evolutionary argument against naturalism. Plantinga notes, for example, that a number of prominent philosophers who are materialists share his intuition that material objects can't think, citing, for example, Paul Churchland and Jaegwon Kim (p. 222). Plantinga also notes, correctly in my judgment, that "An essential part of Tooley's attempt to show how a material object can think and have beliefs, therefore, is his assumption that such objects can have experiences" (p. 223) -- an assumption that Plantinga -- rightly in my judgment -- thinks he is not entitled to make. As Plantinga notes: "He's certainly entitled to argue for this proposition (he doesn't); but he can't sensibly just assume it" (p. 223). Plantinga concludes this part of his response by stating his "two main criticisms" of Tooley's (materialistic) naturalism.

First, the assumption that material objects can have experience is unsupported, gratuitous, and, in this context, question-begging. And second, the claim that a mere sequence of qualia can be a belief, with the entertainment with assent that goes with belief, is clearly false (pp. 226-227).
In Chapter 6, "Closing Statement and Response to Plantinga's Comments", Tooley discusses Plantinga's responses to his two arguments: his argument that atheism, rather than theism or agnosticism, is the default position; and his argument from evil against the existence of God. He explains that given that there are "degrees of belief" with respect, say, to theism or atheism, it seems best to use the term 'agnostic' to cover cases where one thinks that the existence of God and the non-existence of God are equally likely, or where one has no subjective probability at all concerning the relevant proposition -- no degree of assent at all. (p. 254)

Another possible conception of agnosticism is simply the view that we lack knowledge with respect to the existence of God. One might be disposed to believe there is no God, but profess to be an agnostic because he doesn't know that God does not exist. Because of these considerations, I suspect it is somewhat restrictive for Tooley to limit "agnosticism" to cases where one "thinks that the existence and the non-existence of God are equally likely, or where one has no subjective probability at all concerning the relevant proposition -- no degree of assent at all" (p. 234).
Replying to Plantinga's response to his argument from evil (the Lisbon earthquake) -- "Tooley's premise presupposes that belief in God is not justified" (p. 171), Tooley claims that the fact that God permits the Lisbon earthquake does not justify him in permitting it -- "while it entails that there must have been a rightmaking property, it is not itself a rightmaking property" (p. 238). This remark seems right.

Tooley concludes his closing statement and response to Plantinga's comments, by considering the argument from evil versus justifications for believing in the existence of God. Recognizing that Anselm's ontological argument, an argument that Plantinga has defended, would, if successful, establish the necessary existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being, he replies, without argument, that Gaunilo's objection can be used to show that there necessarily exists an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly evil being.

This is a very fine book, presenting arguments for and against theism and naturalism by two very distinguished philosophers. I strongly recommend it for graduate level courses in philosophy of religion.

=====================================
Sursa: ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=13485

adi....link-ul nu era pentru tine...și intuiesc cã într-o aulã academicã (cu fițe și pretenții) ar fi disprețuit...

o sã citesc cartea ...deși am impresia cã nu este vorba despre o carte în sine ci despre o serie de articole publicate de ei (pe net gãsesc....knowledge of god 66 sau 69 sau 70....)....

Ioana, înainte de a pune ºi eu ca tot omul geanã-pe-geanã, dacã tot am intrat aici ºi am pomenit de Plantinga ºi Tooley, aº vrea sã-þi mai fac o recomandare bibliograficã ajutãtoare (pânã ajungi la carte), anume un eseu ulterior discuþie dintre cei doi, în care Plantinga acordeazã ºi mai fin argumentele teiste cu care (dupã pãrerea mea) a fãcut naturalismul-materialist foarte greu de îmbrãþiºat raþional. Te previn însã cã eseul e lung (40 de pagini) ºi anevoios de citit din cauza limbajului tehnic, dar te va rãsplãti pe deplin într-un weekend petrecut în provincie.

Alvin Plantinga, "Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience" (Foundational Research Grant, 2007-2008), www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/plantinga.pdf

Noapte bunã!

De la: adipopa, la data 2010-02-11 00:21:23Ioana, înainte de a pune ºi eu ca tot omul geanã-pe-geanã, dacã tot am intrat aici ºi am pomenit de Plantinga ºi Tooley, aº vrea sã-þi mai fac o recomandare bibliograficã ajutãtoare (pânã ajungi la carte), anume un eseu ulterior discuþie dintre cei doi, în care Plantinga acordeazã ºi mai fin argumentele teiste cu care (dupã pãrerea mea) a fãcut naturalismul-materialist foarte greu de îmbrãþiºat raþional. Te previn însã cã eseul e lung (40 de pagini) ºi anevoios de citit din cauza limbajului tehnic, dar te va rãsplãti pe deplin într-un weekend petrecut în provincie.

Alvin Plantinga, "Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience" (Foundational Research Grant, 2007-2008), www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/plantinga.pdf

Noapte bunã!

multumesc....

noapte buna

Daca ai rabdare iti mai ''pun pe tava'' cel putin inca o suta de ''probleme'' ... de ce nu ... !
Si totusi, unde e Dumnezeul de care vorbiti ?! Ce face ? E in somaj de cand cu criza asta ?!

De la: ioanna_dark, la data 2010-02-10 23:21:32
adi...si totusi...principalele probleme pe care le ridica ateii de obicei sunt
1) exista foarte multe religii pe glob
2) nu putem demonstra cu argumente ca minunile descrise in biblie chiar s-au petrecut in realitate
3) iisus a fost un mare invatat , dar nu a fost dumnezeu...
4) ce s-a intamplat cu iisus era doar a inventie de-a evreilor....
etc...
pe toate le-am auzit pe forumul asta....

Ori suntem capitalisti, ori nu mai suntem.

De la: Dorinel, la data 2010-02-11 12:06:43Daca ai rabdare iti mai ''pun pe tava'' cel putin inca o suta de ''probleme'' ... de ce nu ... !

Dorinel, citeºte ºi tu cartea sau articolul la care am fãcut referire mai sus ºi mã vei convinge cã eºti un cãutãtor onest de rãspunsuri, un partener de dialog informat ºi dispus sã se angajeze într-o dezbatere pe teme teiste de substanþã. Îþi propun cu alte cuvinte sã luãm bucãþi din "Knowledge of God" (ºi/sau eseul lui Plantinga 'Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience') ºi sã le aºezãm pe masã ca teme de analizã filosoficã rudimentarã, nu neaparat cu pretenþii academice. Dacã eºti de acord deci sã facem împreunã o recenzie a discuþiilor Plantinga-Tooley, îmi voi face timp sã intru ceva mai regulat pe forum ºi sã mã þin de subiect (în englezã sau românã).

Bunã Adi!

Când toatã lumea gândeºte la fel înseamnã cã nimeni nu gândeºte.

De la: adipopa, la data 2010-02-12 11:52:56
Dorinel, citeºte ºi tu cartea sau articolul la care am fãcut referire mai sus ºi mã vei convinge cã eºti un cãutãtor onest de rãspunsuri, un partener de dialog informat ºi dispus sã se angajeze într-o dezbatere pe teme teiste de substanþã. Îþi propun cu alte cuvinte sã luãm bucãþi din "Knowledge of God" (ºi/sau eseul lui Plantinga 'Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience') ºi sã le aºezãm pe masã ca teme de analizã filosoficã rudimentarã, nu neaparat cu pretenþii academice. Dacã eºti de acord deci sã facem împreunã o recenzie a discuþiilor Plantinga-Tooley, îmi voi face timp sã intru ceva mai regulat pe forum ºi sã mã þin de subiect (în englezã sau românã).

Adi, imi pare rau dar nu cred ca voi face asta si voi da curs invitatiei tale.
Am sa fiu sincer si am sa-ti spun si de ce: uneori informatiile te buimacesc, pe moment ajung sa te si irite sau sa-ti provoace zambete pe sub mustati cand nu corespund crezurilor tale, si mai pot avea si acea tenta manipulatoare si/sau subiectiva. Depinde de ce parte esti si cum privesti informatia. Nu ca nu le fac fata, nu ca nu-mi plac provocarile, dar e adevarat ca nu la nivel academic, unde sunt pe langa pe acest subiect.
In schimb pot etala acele 100 de ''motive'' ... de ce nu ...!

Ori suntem capitalisti, ori nu mai suntem.

De la: Dorulet, la data 2010-02-12 12:04:03Bunã Adi!

Ciao, Dora! În martie, am o întâlnire la Cluj ºi mi-aº dori sã ne vedem. Dar pânã atunci mai vorbim.

De la: Dorinel, la data 2010-02-12 12:52:58Am sa fiu sincer si am sa-ti spun si de ce: uneori informatiile te buimacesc, pe moment ajung sa te si irite sau sa-ti provoace zambete pe sub mustati cand nu corespund crezurilor tale, si mai pot avea si acea tenta manipulatoare si/sau subiectiva. Depinde de ce parte esti si cum privesti informatia. Nu ca nu le fac fata, nu ca nu-mi plac provocarile, dar e adevarat ca nu la nivel academic, unde sunt pe langa pe acest subiect.
In schimb pot etala acele 100 de ''motive'' ... de ce nu ...!

Dorinel, acceptarea unui text de bazã (“Knowledge of God”) ar avea cel puþin patru avantaje: a) þi-ar permite familiarizarea cu nivelul ºi stadiul contemporan al discuþiilor teiste; b) te-ar descuraja sã ridici banalul celor “100 de probleme” la rang de cunoaºtere autenticã; c) te-ar apleca într-o manierã disciplinatã asupra unui subiect concret; ºi d) þi-ar da ocazia sã recenzezi ambele discursuri înainte de a hotãrî ºi explica de ce unul þi se pare mai raþional ºi mai coerent decât celãlalt (sau cum ai îmbunãtãþi tu un argument care þi se pare slab). Mai sunt desigur ºi alte forum-uri de profil care au preluat ºi discutat critic dialogul dintre Plantinga ºi Tooley, iar cei doi au scris ei înºiºi foarte mult, aºa cã putem consulta ºi face trimitere la literaturã secundarã. Despre motivaþia ta privind respingerea propunerii de a-i citi împreunã cred în esenþã cã nu se susþine deoarece: a) dacã existenþa lui Dumnezeu este într-adevãr un subiect care sã te pasioneze intelectual, faptul cã anumite informaþii te buimãcesc, te iritã sau îþi provoacã zâmbetul nu ar trebui sã te determine sã abdici de la responsabilitatea de a evalua informaþia în mod critic ºi apoi sã justifici raþional obiecþiile pe care le ai; b) tenta manipulatoare ºi/sau subiectivã a unui discurs pe care o invoci este anulatã în acest caz de faptul cã ai faþã în faþã ambele opinii elaborat prezentate ºi cã fiecare filosof interacþioneazã cu ideile celuilalt. În fine, aº fi bineînþeles ºi eu mai atras sã discut cu tine existenþa lui Dumnezeu dacã ne-am concentra asupra unui text ca acesta sau asupra articolului lui Plantinga (dacã nu ai acces la carte).

20 000 EURO pt FIECARE ROMAN MAJOR www.variantacojocaru.ro scoate tabelul , aduna semnaturi de la vecinii tai , apoi trimite lista cu semnaturi la OTV urmareste in fiecare dupaamiaza OTV daca NOI nu ne SALVAM NIMENI NU O VA FACE

20 000 EURO pt FIECARE ROMAN MAJOR www.variantacojocaru.ro scoate tabelul , aduna semnaturi de la vecinii tai , apoi trimite lista cu semnaturi la OTV urmareste in fiecare dupaamiaza OTV daca NOI nu ne SALVAM NIMENI NU O VA FACE

20 000 EURO pt FIECARE ROMAN MAJOR www.variantacojocaru.ro scoate tabelul , aduna semnaturi de la vecinii tai , apoi trimite lista cu semnaturi la OTV urmareste in fiecare dupaamiaza OTV daca NOI nu ne SALVAM NIMENI NU O VA FACE

De la: adyhd1969, la data 2010-03-03 12:11:4620 000 EURO pt FIECARE ROMAN MAJOR www.variantacojocaru.ro scoate tabelul , aduna semnaturi de la vecinii tai , apoi trimite lista cu semnaturi la OTV urmareste in fiecare dupaamiaza OTV daca NOI nu ne SALVAM NIMENI NU O VA FACE

adica indiferent daca accept biblia sau nu, e musai sa urmaresc lista de semnaturi la OTV sa pot sa ma salvez, n-am inteles bine de la ce , dar daca e musai....

N-ai inteles... face reclama OTV-ului. Si-a pierdut audienta si-atunci cauta naivi pe forum sa-i vizioneze Altfel adio bani din publicitate si noul sediu al OTV-ULUI, COSTA!

De la: rodik_mi, la data 2010-03-03 12:51:05N-ai inteles... face reclama OTV-ului. Si-a pierdut audienta si-atunci cauta naivi pe forum sa-i vizioneze Altfel adio bani din publicitate si noul sediu al OTV-ULUI, COSTA!

am inteles f bine, dar mai glumeam si eu tocmai de naivitatea unora care mai cred in asa ceva.
Cit priveste vizionarea OTV, prefer sa privesc cum ies ghioceii din zapada si albinile din stup, sint mai aproape de sufletul meu.

Dex...biblia ...carte de povesti ...pe neintelesul tuturor...a fost scrisa ...ca sa nu fie citita....Nu este indicata liberilor cugetatori....doar pentru necugetatori...pentru cei care iau totul de-a gata ...si pentru cei care cred in para malaiata in gura lui natafleata....

sicer sa fiu eu -as da foc bibliei in mijlocul unei f mari catedrale...o vrajeala ieftina care manipuleaza si tine sub control mase mari de oameni ( prosti sau credinciosi...cum vreti sa le spuneti )

da, da, ai dreptate....citesc in ochii tuturor acel: Doamne fereste ...:)) :)) :))
lasai sa astepte o minune de la cel de sus, sau cel de jos :)))))

Se scrie SINCER nu sicer !

De la: 1q_K, la data 2011-02-10 06:26:17sicer sa fiu eu -as da foc bibliei in mijlocul unei f mari catedrale...o vrajeala ieftina care manipuleaza si tine sub control mase mari de oameni ( prosti sau credinciosi...cum vreti sa le spuneti )

Pe noi prostii nu ne vrajeste,bre . Noi avem de toate si mai bune si mai rele ,bune rele sinchisori si libertate si noroi si stele (de unde dreaq imi vine respiratia asta?) ,mam nascut poiet intro poiata langa tomberonul de langa coltul unui bloc

Decat batran si sarac mai bine tanar si bogat!

In cuda multor controverse, BIBLIA este o lucrare de capatai, inventata si scrisa pentru a putea subjuga multe popoare, multe natiuni care de-a lungul istoriei sau supus orbeste acestei credinte sub diferite forme, izvorata in ,,marea carte" a omenirii. Am observat ca in vechiul testament, plecand de la facerea omului perpetuarea speciei umane se face prin incest, daca gresesc va rog sa ma contraziceti, iar ce urmeaza dupa acest fapt, este simpla lectie de educatie a celor care sunt dispusi sa o asculte. Nu sunt ateu, cred in echilibrul impus de Dumnezeul nostru, dar nu pot fi prostit cu ,,INTRUPAREA'" sau alte povesti de 2 lei. De ce nu se mai ,,INTRUPEAZA" nimeni astazi ?

Asta e topicul meu de suflet ! Ce mai certuri trageam eu pe aici cu ioana ! Cred ca s-a maritat daca nu o fi divortat intre timp,ca prea a disparut de pe forum . Are....obligatii Sau poate ca s-a maturizat (mai am si eu putin) sau poate ca nu mai crede in ce credea .

De la: 9am243912, la data 2011-02-11 09:08:17In cuda multor controverse, BIBLIA este o lucrare de capatai, inventata si scrisa pentru a putea subjuga multe popoare, multe natiuni care de-a lungul istoriei sau supus orbeste acestei credinte sub diferite forme, izvorata in ,,marea carte" a omenirii. Am observat ca in vechiul testament, plecand de la facerea omului perpetuarea speciei umane se face prin incest, daca gresesc va rog sa ma contraziceti, iar ce urmeaza dupa acest fapt, este simpla lectie de educatie a celor care sunt dispusi sa o asculte. Nu sunt ateu, cred in echilibrul impus de Dumnezeul nostru, dar nu pot fi prostit cu ,,INTRUPAREA'" sau alte povesti de 2 lei. De ce nu se mai ,,INTRUPEAZA" nimeni astazi ?

de unde stii ? tu nu esti IN TRUP , deci o INTRUPATA ? Sufletul tau nu este "inchis" intr-un Trup de carne si deci , Sufletul Nemuritor e Intrupat intr-o "haina" muritoare ? nu-ti spune si preotul ca trupul se intoarce in tarina din care a fost facut si SUFLETUL despartit de corp, se duce-n loc de verdeata, unde nu-i nici durere, nici intristare ? si Facerea ce spune ? ca Dumnezeu a plamadit din lut pe Adam si a SUFLAT asupra lui si el s-a INSUFLETIT ! ....toata Viata noastra e un periplu pe Terra si o Invatare ptr ca, prin Cunoastere sa ne MINTUIM de lantul INTRUPARILOR !

De la: gabigabi, la data 2011-02-15 10:23:31

De la: 9am243912, la data 2011-02-11 09:08:17In cuda multor controverse, BIBLIA este o lucrare de capatai, inventata si scrisa pentru a putea subjuga multe popoare, multe natiuni care de-a lungul istoriei sau supus orbeste acestei credinte sub diferite forme, izvorata in ,,marea carte" a omenirii. Am observat ca in vechiul testament, plecand de la facerea omului perpetuarea speciei umane se face prin incest, daca gresesc va rog sa ma contraziceti, iar ce urmeaza dupa acest fapt, este simpla lectie de educatie a celor care sunt dispusi sa o asculte. Nu sunt ateu, cred in echilibrul impus de Dumnezeul nostru, dar nu pot fi prostit cu ,,INTRUPAREA'" sau alte povesti de 2 lei. De ce nu se mai ,,INTRUPEAZA" nimeni astazi ?

de unde stii ? tu nu esti IN TRUP , deci o INTRUPATA ? Sufletul tau nu este "inchis" intr-un Trup de carne si deci , Sufletul Nemuritor e Intrupat intr-o "haina" muritoare ? nu-ti spune si preotul ca trupul se intoarce in tarina din care a fost facut si SUFLETUL despartit de corp, se duce-n loc de verdeata, unde nu-i nici durere, nici intristare ? si Facerea ce spune ? ca Dumnezeu a plamadit din lut pe Adam si a SUFLAT asupra lui si el s-a INSUFLETIT ! ....toata Viata noastra e un periplu pe Terra si o Invatare ptr ca, prin Cunoastere sa ne MINTUIM de lantul INTRUPARILOR !

Imi place bancu asta !

Decat batran si sarac mai bine tanar si bogat!

biblia....o carte rasuflata

Stiinta de pestera.....